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United States v. Bryant, Federal Habitual Offender 
Laws, and the Rights of Defendants in Tribal 
Courts: A Better Solution to Domestic Violence 
Exists 
ABSTRACT 
“If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you.”  
Since Miranda v. Arizona, that popularized phrase has widely been 
regarded as true in the United States.  However, because the Bill of Rights 
does not apply to Native American tribes, defendants in tribal courts are 
regularly sentenced to imprisonment without the aid of counsel.  One of 
those defendants was Michael Bryant, who has several convictions for 
domestic assault and was not appointed counsel even though he was 
indigent and imprisoned.  
Domestic assault is a terrible problem in Native American 
communities.  Native American women suffer from domestic violence at 
higher rates than any other racial group.  In an effort to reduce domestic 
violence in the tribes, Congress criminalized domestic assault by a habitual 
offender.  That crime requires two prior convictions, which can be obtained 
in tribal courts.  However, because the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) does 
not guarantee the same rights as the United States Constitution, a 
conviction may be valid in tribal court even though it would have been 
unconstitutional had it been obtained in state or federal court.  That 
conviction may then be used as a predicate offense for domestic assault by 
a habitual offender. 
In United States v. Bryant, the Supreme Court held that it is 
permissible to use uncounseled tribal court convictions as predicate 
offenses.  The Court decided the issue, but a sense of injustice remains.  It 
seems backhanded to use uncounseled tribal convictions to prove an 
element of a federal offense when those same convictions could not be used 
if they had been obtained in a different court.  This Note proposes three 
solutions.  One solution is to amend the Indian Civil Rights Act to make 
tribal court defendants’ rights coexistant with state or federal court 
defendants’ rights.  Another is to give tribal courts the authority to impose 
harsher penalties for domestic assault instead of leaving the federal 
government as the only court system with the ability to impose adequate 
penalties.  A third proposal is to expand the jurisdiction of tribal courts to 
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allow them to prosecute non-members who commit offenses on tribal lands.  
Each of these solutions preserves the Court’s reasoning in United States v. 
Bryant while making the process more just for offenders, victims, and the 
tribes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Michael Bryant is a member of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and lives 
on its reservation in Montana.1  He has more than one hundred tribal court 
convictions, several of which are for domestic assault.2  In 1999, he 
attempted to strangle his girlfriend and hit her on the head with a beer 
bottle.3  In 2007, he assaulted a different girlfriend by kneeing her in the 
face, “leaving her bruised, bloodied, and with a broken nose.”4  In 2011, he 
assaulted another girlfriend, C.L.O.,5 “by dragging her off the bed, pulling 
her hair, and punching and kicking her.”6  Bryant also admitted that he had 
assaulted her five or six times.7  In 2011, he assaulted yet another 
girlfriend, D.E.,8 by choking her “until she almost passed out.”9  He further 
admitted to assaulting this girlfriend on three different occasions.10 
Bryant’s pattern of violence is not uncommon in Native American 
communities.  While it is often difficult to quantify domestic violence 
because those crimes are largely unreported,11 studies have consistently 
found that Native American women experience domestic violence at higher 
rates than other racial groups.12  A Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 
study found that 45.9% of Native American women are victims of domestic 
assault, as compared to 31.7% of white women.13  Likewise, a Department 
of Justice study found that 30.7% of Native American women and 21.3% 
 
 1. United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420, slip op. at 10 (U.S. June 13, 2016). 
 2. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Bryant, No. 15-420 (citing Presentence Investigation 
Report ¶¶ 26, 81 [hereinafter PSR]). 
 3. Id. (citing PSR ¶ 81). 
 4. Id. 
 5. United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 6. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 8 (citing Joint Appendix at 38, Bryant, No. 
15-420 [hereinafter J.A.]); see PSR ¶ 11 (quoting victim’s affidavit in which she stated 
defendant “had repeatedly abused her over a four-month period and that the violence 
escalated with the February 2011 attack”)). 
 7. Id. (citing PSR ¶ 35). 
 8. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673. 
 9. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 2, at 8 (citing J.A. at 38). 
 10. Id. (citing PSR ¶¶ 28, 33). 
 11. RONET BACHMAN ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA 
NATIVE WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE: WHAT IS KNOWN 104 (2008). 
 12. See MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L 
CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, DIVISION OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION, NATIONAL 
INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 40 (2011). 
 13. Id. 
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of white women experience domestic assault at some point in their 
lifetimes.14 
To reduce domestic assault in Native American communities, 
Congress amended the Violence Against Women Act (hereinafter referred 
to as § 117) to criminalize domestic assault by a habitual offender.15  That 
Act has a predicate offense element, meaning that prior domestic assault 
convictions are necessary for conviction of this federal crime.16  The statute 
applies to “[a]ny person who commits a domestic assault within . . . Indian 
country and who has a final conviction on at least 2 separate prior 
occasions in Federal, State, or Indian tribal court proceedings” for domestic 
assault, sexual abuse, or interstate domestic violence.17  The penalty is a 
fine and up to five years’ imprisonment if the victim does not suffer 
substantial bodily injury or up to ten years’ imprisonment if there is 
substantial bodily injury.18 
Since the purpose of this statute was, in large part, to reduce domestic 
violence in Native American communities,19 it cannot be viewed in 
isolation from other federal laws that regulate criminal proceedings in tribal 
courts.  Although the Sixth Amendment has been interpreted to require 
appointed counsel when a defendant is sentenced to any term of 
imprisonment,20 the Bill of Rights does not apply to defendants in tribal 
courts.21  Instead, the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) protects those 
defendants.22  The ICRA differs from the U.S. Constitution in that it only 
requires appointed counsel if the defendant is incarcerated for more than a 
year.23 
Because of this difference between the ICRA and the Constitution, 
Native American offenders may be validly convicted of crimes in tribal 
court proceedings that would be unconstitutional in state or federal court.  
 
 14. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, 
AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 26 (2000). 
 15. 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (Supp. II 2014). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. 
 19. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109–162, sec. 901–02, 119 Stat. 2960, 3077–78 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 3796gg–10 (2012)). 
 20. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979). 
 21. See Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 1976) (explaining that the 
United States Constitution does not apply to the tribes because they are “quasi-sovereign 
nations”). 
 22. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012). 
 23. Id. § 1302(c). 
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For example, on several occasions Michael Bryant was convicted of 
domestic assault in tribal court and imprisoned even though he was without 
counsel.24  Those uncounseled convictions would violate the Sixth 
Amendment if they had been obtained in state or federal court.  However, 
they were nonetheless used for the predicate offense element in the federal 
habitual offender crime.25  In his appeal, Bryant argued that because his 
convictions would have violated the Sixth Amendment had they been 
obtained in state or federal court, they could not be used as an element of a 
federal offense.26 
Bryant’s case presents federal courts with a conundrum.  On one hand, 
it seems unfair and unconstitutional to use convictions that would be 
invalid in state or federal court to prove an element of a federal crime.  On 
the other hand, Congress determined that violent crimes against women in 
Indian territory are a problem and ought to be reduced,27 so it provided 
harsher penalties in § 117.  Can tribal court convictions that do not comport 
with the Sixth Amendment be used as predicate offenses for § 117? 
 This conundrum resulted in a circuit split.  In 2011, the Eighth Circuit 
upheld the use of uncounseled convictions for § 117,28 and the Tenth 
Circuit followed suit twenty days later.29  In those circuits, it is permissible 
to use uncounseled tribal convictions for the predicate offense element.  
When Michael Bryant’s case arrived at the Ninth Circuit, that court 
reversed his § 117 convictions, deeming use of uncounseled tribal 
convictions unconstitutional.30  The Ninth Circuit’s holding therefore 
conflicted with the Eighth and Tenth Circuits’ interpretations of § 117.  In 
2016, the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split.31  In Bryant, the Court 
unanimously held that it was permissible to use Bryant’s uncounseled tribal 
convictions to establish the predicate offense element of § 117.32 
The problem is now legally resolved, but a sense of unfairness 
remains.  Defendants are not afforded the same level of protection in tribal 
court as they receive in state or federal court. Tribal convictions that would 
not stand under the Sixth Amendment may subsequently be used to convict 
 
 24. United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420, slip op. at 1–2 (U.S. June 13, 2016). 
 25. Id. at 11–12. 
 26. See id. at 13. 
 27. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109–162, sec. 901–02, 119 Stat. 2960, 3077–78 (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 3796gg–10 (2012)). 
 28. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 29. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 1000 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 30. United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 679 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 31. See United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420, slip op. at 16 (U.S. June 13, 2016). 
 32. Id. 
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defendants of an offense that may result in five or even ten years in federal 
prison.  This Note attempts to offer a solution to that problem while 
retaining the sound reasoning of Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Bryant.  Part 
I summarizes the right to counsel in federal and tribal jurisdictions, along 
with the epidemic of domestic violence in tribal territories.  Part II analyzes 
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion and Justice Thomas’s concurring 
opinion in Bryant.  Part III proposes three viable solutions, each of which 
would increase fairness to defendants, victims, and the tribes after the 
Court’s decision in Bryant. 
I. TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY, FEDERAL LEGISLATION, AND BRYANT’S 
CONUNDRUM 
The United States government enacted § 117 to reduce widespread 
domestic violence, but the balance struck between tribal sovereignty and 
federal law leaves tribal defendants without key protections.  Because the 
tribes are, to a certain degree, sovereign nations, the Bill of Rights does not 
apply to criminal defendants in tribal courts.33  Part A offers a history of 
tribal sovereignty and federal jurisdiction so as to better explain why 
Bryant lacked the protection of the Sixth Amendment.  Part B then 
compares the Sixth Amendment and the Indian Civil Rights Act to 
highlight the differences in the afforded right to counsel.  Part C provides 
an overview of domestic violence statistics in Native American 
communities for context on why § 117 was enacted, and Part D describes 
§ 117. 
A. Tribal Sovereignty and the Extent of Federal Jurisdiction 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century and after more than two 
hundred years of colonization, trade, war, and treaties with Native 
Americans, the new United States government still had not fully defined its 
relationship with the diverse Native American tribes.34  Three Supreme 
Court opinions authored by Chief Justice John Marshall—Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, and Worcester v.              
 
 33. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does 
not apply to the Cherokee tribe because its power to prosecute crimes was not created by the 
Constitution).  See also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) (“As 
separate sovereigns pre-existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as 
unconstrained by those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on 
federal or state authority.”). 
 34. See Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of “Domestic Dependent 
Nations” in the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, 
and Re-empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443 (2005). 
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Georgia—attempted to resolve the question of just how much sovereignty 
the tribes retained after the United States became a nation.35 
In Johnson v. M’Intosh, the Court held that land grants made by 
Native Americans were invalid.36  The Court called Native Americans 
“occupants” of the land, but held that “exclusive title” was conveyed to the 
discovering Europeans.37  Chief Justice Marshall adopted the position that 
“discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of 
occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest; and gave also a right to such 
a degree of sovereignty, as the circumstances of the people would allow 
them to exercise.”38  Thus, Native American tribes were only as sovereign 
as the United States permitted them to be. 
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Cherokee Nation sued for an 
injunction to prevent Georgia from enforcing its laws within Cherokee 
territory.39  The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction because the Cherokee 
Nation was not a foreign state.40  Chief Justice Marshall called the Native 
Americans “domestic dependent nations . . . in a state of pupilage” whose 
“relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”41  
Johnson established that Native American sovereignty was to be shaped by 
the United States, and Cherokee Nation further specified the limited 
character of tribal sovereignty. 
In the final case of the trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice 
Marshall limited the states’ rights to regulate Native American territory and 
confirmed the federal government’s authority to do so.42  Worcester, a 
missionary sent to Cherokee land in Georgia by the federal government,43 
was arrested under a Georgia law that prohibited white people from living 
on Cherokee land.44  The Court deemed the Georgia law unconstitutional, 
holding the Cherokee nation “is a distinct community, occupying its own 
 
 35. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 
(1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).  
 36. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 604–05. 
 37. Id. at 574. 
 38. Id. at 587. 
 39. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2, 15. 
 40. Id. at 19–20. The United States Constitution gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction 
over cases in which a state is sued by a foreign state.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  Therefore, in 
holding that the Cherokee Nation is not a foreign state, the Court held that it lacks 
jurisdiction.  Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 20. 
 41. Id. at 17. 
 42. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
 43. Id. at 537–38. 
 44. Id. at 539. 
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territory . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no force.”45  The reason 
Georgia lacked authority, however, is not because the Cherokees have any 
power over the states.  Instead, it is because the federal government has the 
exclusive ability to regulate the United States’ relationship with the Native 
American tribes.46  The Cherokees are not superior to the state; rather, the 
federal government is superior to both.   
A few decades later, the United States’ authority to limit tribal 
sovereignty was tested.47  Crow Dog, a member of the Sioux Nation, was 
convicted under federal law48 of killing another Sioux within Sioux 
territory.49  He was sentenced to death.50  Crow Dog was prosecuted under 
a federal statute that imposed death on any person who committed murder 
on land within exclusive federal jurisdiction.51  The issue, then, was 
whether the place where the homicide was committed—Sioux land—was 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,52 or whether the 
tribes retained jurisdiction when a crime was committed by a member 
against a member within tribal land.  Because of the then existing federal 
policy, which left each tribe to prosecute crimes “according to its local 
customs,” the Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction.53 
In reaction to Crow Dog and to ensure that federal courts have 
jurisdiction over crimes committed within Native American territory, 
Congress used its authority established by Johnson, Cherokee Nation, and 
Worcester to pass the Major Crimes Act.54  The Act provides that any 
Native American who commits a major crime such as murder, kidnapping, 
felony assault, arson, burglary, or robbery within Native American land and 
against any person, including another Native American, “shall be subject to 
the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the 
above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.”55  
 
 45. Id. at 561. 
 46. Id.; see also United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 595 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(“Congress, however, enjoys broad power to regulate tribal affairs and limit or expand tribal 
sovereignty through the Indian Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the 
Treaty Clause, art. II, § 2, cl. 2.”). 
 47. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
 48. Id. at 557.  Crow Dog was convicted in the district court of the Territory of Dakota, 
which had the authority to enforce United States laws.  Id. at 560. 
 49. Id. at 557. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 558. 
 52. Id. at 559–60. 
 53. Id. at 571–72. 
 54. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012); See also Keeble v. United States, 
412 U.S. 205, 209 (1973) (noting that the Act was passed in reaction to Crow Dog). 
 55. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). 
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Therefore, the federal government can prosecute the crimes enumerated in 
the Major Crimes Act even if they occur within tribal land and between 
tribal members. 
The Supreme Court upheld federal jurisdiction of major crimes in 
United States v. Kagama.56  In Kagama, the Native American defendant 
was indicted for killing a Native American victim on the Hoopa Valley 
Reservation.57  The Court held that the United States government is 
sovereign and can legislate over Native American reservations because 
they are within the boundaries of the United States.58  Prosecuting the 
crimes listed in the Major Crimes Act is “within the competency of 
Congress.”59  Invoking Cherokee Nation and Worcester, the Court called 
the tribes “wards of the nation” that are “dependent on the United States”60 
and held that “[t]he power of the General Government over these remnants 
of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is 
necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom 
they dwell.”61 
Kagama leaves no question as to the United States’ jurisdiction to 
prosecute crimes authorized by Congress in tribal areas.  The remaining 
issue is the extent of the tribes’ jurisdiction.  Tribal courts can and do 
prosecute crimes that are not covered by the Major Crimes Act, including 
domestic assault.62  Whether a crime is prosecuted in a United States court 
or in a tribal court is a key question given the differing levels of 
constitutional and state protection afforded to defendants in the two 
systems. 
B. Defendants in Tribal Courts Do Not Have the Same Level of Protection 
that the Bill of Rights Provides 
Congress can pass legislation regarding Native American tribes, but 
because tribes are “quasi-sovereign nations,”63 the Bill of Rights does not 
apply to criminal proceedings in tribal courts.64  In its place, Congress 
enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act.65  Although the ICRA has many 
 
 56. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
 57. Id. at 376. 
 58. Id. at 378–80. 
 59. Id. at 383. 
 60. Id. at 383–84. 
 61. Id. at 384. 
 62. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 679 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 63. Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012). 
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familiar protections for defendants, such as prohibitions against double 
jeopardy66 and self-incrimination,67 as well as the right to a speedy and 
public trial,68 it offers a lower level of protection regarding appointed 
counsel than the Sixth Amendment. 
1. The Sixth Amendment Right to Appointed Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment states that “the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”69  The seminal 
right to counsel case is Gideon v. Wainwright.70  Gideon was charged with 
the felony offense of breaking and entering with intent to commit a 
misdemeanor.71  He was indigent but was not appointed counsel.  At trial, 
Gideon was convicted and sentenced to five years of imprisonment.72  
Holding that the assistance of counsel is a necessity in the adversarial 
system, the court deemed his uncounseled felony conviction 
unconstitutional, reasoning he could not be given a “fair trial unless 
counsel is provided for him.”73 
Nine years later, the Court required appointed counsel for a 
misdemeanor conviction for unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon.74  In 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, the defendant had received a ninety day sentence.75  
The Court held that appointed counsel is required for any charge which 
results in imprisonment, whether it is a felony or a misdemeanor.76  Like in 
Gideon, the Court reasoned that a fair trial or plea could not occur in such 
cases unless the defendant was represented.77  If unrepresented, the 
 
 66. Id. § 1302(a)(3). 
 67. Id. § 1302(a)(4). 
 68. Id. § 1302(a)(6). 
 69. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy . . . the assistance of counsel for his defense.”), with 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (providing 
that “[i]n a criminal proceeding in which an Indian tribe . . . imposes a total term of 
imprisonment of more than 1 year on a defendant,” defendants will have the right to 
effective assistance of counsel equal to that provided by the constitution and indigent 
defendants will have a defense attorney provided at the expense of the tribal government). 
 70. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 71. Id. at 336. 
 72. Id. at 337. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 26–27 (1972). 
 75. Id. at 37. 
 76. Id.  See also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (clarifying that the 
holding in Argersinger only applies to cases that result in actual imprisonment, not merely 
the possibility). 
 77. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36–37. 
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defendant would likely become the victim of the rushed, “assembly-line 
justice” of an overburdened court system.78 
These Sixth Amendment cases, taken together, establish the rule that 
appointed counsel is required in cases where the defendant faces actual 
imprisonment.  If there is a violation of that right—if the defendant is 
convicted, imprisoned, and did not receive appointed counsel or waive his 
right to counsel—those convictions cannot be used for certain purposes in 
later proceedings.  For example, uncounseled convictions that result in 
imprisonment cannot be used in subsequent proceedings to convict the 
defendant under a recidivist statute79 or to impeach his credibility.80  
However, uncounseled convictions that result in imprisonment can be used 
as a predicate conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon.81  
Furthermore, uncounseled convictions for which the defendant was not 
imprisoned can be used to enhance sentencing for subsequent convictions.82 
2. The Right to Counsel in Tribal Court Proceedings 
While the Sixth Amendment requires appointed counsel if the 
defendant faces any term of imprisonment, the Indian Civil Rights Act does 
not require appointed counsel in all cases where the defendant is 
imprisoned.83  Tribal courts may impose punishment of up to three years of 
incarceration,84 but they are only required to appoint counsel when a 
defendant is imprisoned for more than one year.85  Therefore, if an indigent 
defendant faces, for example, six months’ imprisonment for a charge in 
tribal court, he does not have the right to appointed counsel.  If he had been 
indicted in state or federal court, he would have had the right to appointed 
counsel. 
3. The Conundrum Created by the Difference in the Right to Counsel 
Valid prior convictions can be used in subsequent proceedings for a 
variety of purposes.  As referenced above, they could potentially be used in 
recidivist statutes,86 to impeach a defendant’s credibility,87 or to enhance 
 
 78. Id. at 36. 
 79. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967). 
 80. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483 (1972). 
 81. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65–67 (1980). 
 82. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748–49 (1994). 
 83. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (2012). 
 84. Id. § 1302(b). 
 85. Id. §§ 1302(c)(1)–(2). 
 86. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967). 
 87. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483 (1972). 
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sentences.88  However, issues arise when uncounseled tribal convictions 
that resulted in imprisonment are subsequently used in federal or state 
proceedings.  Such convictions would have been unconstitutional if 
obtained in a federal or state court, but are they valid in later United States 
proceedings because they were validly obtained in tribal court?  Or are 
federal courts prohibited from using these convictions for any purpose 
because they violate the Sixth Amendment? 
This conundrum is particularly troublesome in the wake of § 117, 
which criminalizes domestic assault by a habitual offender and permits the 
use of tribal court convictions as predicate offenses.  Before discussing that 
statute, it is helpful to understand why it was enacted. 
C. The Epidemic of Domestic Violence in Tribal Territory 
Accurate statistics regarding domestic violence and its prosecution are 
often difficult to obtain because those crimes are “widely believed to be 
underreported.”89  One study estimated that only 53% of victimizations of 
American Indian and Alaskan Native women are reported to the police.90 
Despite challenges in measuring domestic violence, studies 
consistently rank Native American women as the racial group most 
victimized by domestic assault and rape.  One in three Native American 
women are raped at some point in their lives.91  The Congressional findings 
for § 117 state that every year, “Indian women experience 7 sexual assaults 
per 1,000, compared with 4 per 1,000 among Black Americans, 3 per 1,000 
among Caucasians, 2 per 1,000 among Hispanic women, and 1 per 1,000 
among Asian women.”92  Native American women are also nearly three 
times more likely to be victims of a battery than white women.93 
 This premise is corroborated by three other studies, which also rank 
Native American women as the group most often victimized by sexual 
assault and domestic violence.  First, a CDC study found that 45.9% of 
Native American women experience physical violence by an intimate 
partner, compared to 40.9% of black women, 35.2% of Hispanic women, 
 
 88. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 748–49 (1994). 
 89. Brief for Dennis K. Burke, Former United States Attorney et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420 (U.S. June 13, 2016). 
 90. BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 52. 
 91. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-162, sec. 901, 119 Stat. 2960, 3077–78 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3796gg–10 (2012)). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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and 31.7% of white women.94  A Department of Justice study similarly 
found, “American Indians/Alaska Native women report significantly higher 
rates of intimate partner violence.”95  The study found that 30.7% of Native 
American women experience physical assault, compared to 26.3% of 
African American women, 21.3% of white women, and 12.8% of Asian 
and Pacific Islander women.96  Further, a National Crime Victimization 
Survey measured rates of intimate partner violence, which includes rapes, 
robberies, and assaults, and found that “American Indian and Alaska 
Native women have the highest rate of victimization (18.2) compared to 
either African American (8.2), white (6.3), or Asian American (1.5) 
women.”97 
Assaults against Native American women are also likely to be more 
severe than assaults against women of other races.98  In 70% of assaults 
against American Indian and Alaska Native women, the perpetrator injured 
the victim, and 56% of those injuries suffered required medical care.99  
Sixty-three percent of assaulted African American women experienced 
physical injuries, 49% of which required medical care.100  Finally, 60% of 
assaults on white women resulted in injury, and 38% of those injuries 
required medical care.101 
 Some scholars attempt to explain Native Americans’ higher rate of 
victimization by looking to their history of oppression.  One theory is that 
“domination and oppression of native peoples increased both economic 
deprivation and dependency through retracting tribal rights and 
sovereignty,” placing them “at greater risk for victimization than other 
groups who did not share similar historical inequalities.”102  A resource for 
federal prosecutors and law enforcement lists several causes of domestic 
violence in Native American communities, including “historical trauma, 
geographic isolation, drug and alcohol abuse, the threat of homelessness, 
pressure from friends and family, too few law enforcement officials 
policing a vast amount of land, and an unwillingness to report offenses due 
to dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system.”103  
 
 94. BLACK ET AL., supra note 12, at 40. 
 95. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 14, at 26. 
 96. Id. 
 97. BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 47. 
 98. Id. at 49. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 67. 
 103. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, USING FEDERAL LAW TO 
PROSECUTE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CRIMES IN INDIAN COUNTRY 9. 
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While tribal governments have made important efforts to combat 
domestic violence, the court systems’ structures and available resources 
impact how those courts handle domestic violence cases.  Tribal courts 
often face “practical problems of funding, training, coordination, and 
jurisdictional complexities.”104  They also have “scarce resources [that] 
must be stretched across vast geographic areas,” and “[t]he victims face 
even greater challenges, as many live in small, isolated communities where 
they may feel intense pressure to remain silent, or fear violent 
retaliation.”105  Therefore, a history of oppression, poverty, substance 
abuse, and isolation, combined with poorly resourced court systems, likely 
explains Native Americans’ higher rates of domestic violence.  
D. Domestic Assault by a Habitual Offender 
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 117 in response to the epidemic of 
domestic violence in Native American communities.  The stated purposes 
of the law are: 
(1) to decrease the incidence of violent crimes against Indian women; (2) to 
strengthen the capacity of Indian tribes to exercise their sovereign authority 
to respond to violent crimes committed against Indian women; and (3) to 
ensure that perpetrators of violent crimes committed against Indian women 
are held accountable for their criminal behavior.106 
In practice, the law targets domestic violence in Native American 
communities.  A group of former United States Attorneys filed an amicus 
brief in Bryant, writing that § 117 is an “important tool” to stop the pattern 
of escalating domestic violence on tribal lands.107  The facilitator guide for 
prosecutors and law enforcement also encourages the use of § 117 to 
prosecute domestic assaults in tribal lands.108 
The statute itself is fairly straightforward.  If a person commits a 
domestic assault and already has two or more prior convictions for 
domestic assault in any federal, state, or tribal court, the statute provides 
that he may be convicted of domestic assault by a habitual offender and 
imprisoned for up to five years, or up to ten years if the victim suffers 
substantial bodily injury.109 
 
 104. BACHMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 69. 
 105. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 5. 
 106. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-162, sec. 901, 119 Stat. 2960, 3078 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3796gg–10 (2012)). 
 107. Brief for Dennis K. Burke, supra note 89, at 10. 
 108. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 103, at 28–29. 
 109. 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (Supp. II 2014). 
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The problem with the statute is that it allows tribal convictions to be 
used as predicate offenses for federal proceedings.  A § 117 conviction 
requires at least two prior domestic violence or sexual assault convictions 
in federal, state, or tribal court proceedings.110  As described above, 
defendants in tribal courts do not have the same right to counsel as 
defendants in United States courts.  A defendant may be convicted under 
§ 117 using a conviction that was valid in tribal court but would not have 
been valid if obtained in state or federal court. 
II. RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: UNITED STATES V. BRYANT 
The applicability of uncounseled tribal convictions to § 117 created a 
circuit split among the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, which the 
Supreme Court resolved in United States v. Bryant. 
A. The Circuit Split  
Three circuits have addressed whether uncounseled tribal convictions 
may be used as predicate offenses for § 117.  The Ninth Circuit held 
prosecutors may not use prior convictions that do not comport with the 
Sixth Amendment.111  However, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits upheld the 
use of uncounseled tribal convictions to fulfill the predicate offense 
element of § 117.112 
In United States v. Ant, the Ninth Circuit held that uncounseled tribal 
court pleas could not be used as evidence of guilt in subsequent federal 
proceedings for charges based on the same conduct.113  Ant, unrepresented 
by counsel, confessed and pleaded guilty in tribal court to killing his niece.  
His confession and plea were subsequently used against him in a federal 
trial for voluntary manslaughter.114  Since he was unrepresented by counsel 
when he initially pleaded guilty, the Ninth Circuit held that it was error for 
the federal prosecution to use that plea.115  This holding was not intended to 
violate principles of comity or “disparage the tribal proceedings;” the tribal 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Ant, 
882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 112. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 113. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1396. 
 114. Id. at 1390–91. 
 115. Id. at 1396. 
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conviction remained valid even though it could not be used in the 
subsequent federal proceeding.116 
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit held in United States v. Cavanaugh that 
“the predicate convictions, valid at their inception, and not alleged to be 
otherwise unreliable, may be used to prove the elements of § 117.”117  
While driving in a car with his children, Cavanaugh slammed his wife’s 
head into the dashboard and threatened to kill her.118  He was charged 
under § 117, but the district court dismissed the indictment because the 
predicate offenses were uncounseled.119  In reversing the district court, the 
Eighth Circuit emphasized that the prior, predicate convictions were 
constitutionally sound because they were obtained in tribal court in 
compliance with the ICRA.120  The court held it could not “preclude use of 
the prior conviction merely because it would have been invalid had it arisen 
from a state or federal court.”121  The court distinguished its holding from 
Ant based on the conduct at issue in each case.  In Ant, the tribal conviction 
was used to prove a federal offense based on the same conduct.  However, 
in § 117, the domestic assault for which defendant is tried is based on 
conduct different from that in the predicate offenses.122 
The Tenth Circuit issued an opinion in United States v. Shavanaux 
twenty days after Cavanaugh, also holding that prior uncounseled 
convictions could be used as predicate offenses under § 117.123  In 
Shavanaux, the indigent defendant was not appointed counsel but was 
represented in his tribal cases by a lay advocate that he hired himself.124  
On appeal, the defendant raised Sixth Amendment, Due Process, and Equal 
Protection claims.125  The court held that the Sixth Amendment was not 
violated when the convictions were obtained because it did not apply to the 
tribal court proceedings.  Therefore, it could not be violated when those 
valid convictions were used in federal court.126  Additionally, the court held 
there was no Due Process violation because the tribal convictions complied 
with the ICRA.127  Shavanaux argued that because § 117 targets Native 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 594. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 603–05. 
 121. Id. at 604 (emphasis omitted). 
 122. Id. 
 123. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 1000 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 124. Id. at 996. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 998. 
 127. Id. at 1000. 
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American communities, it violates his right to equal protection under the 
law.128  The court disagreed, holding that his status as a Native American 
“is not a racial classification, but a political one.”129  In fact, “Shavanaux 
was not subjected to differential treatment in federal court because of his 
ancestry, but because of his voluntary association with an Indian tribe.  
Through his tribal membership and residence in Indian country, Shavanaux 
chose to submit himself to tribal jurisdiction and the criminal procedures of 
the Ute tribe.”130  Applying a rational basis test, the Tenth Circuit found 
that § 117 is rationally related to the legitimate interest of reducing 
domestic violence in Native American communities.131  Therefore, there 
was no equal protection violation.132 
Unconvinced, the Ninth Circuit went in a different direction with 
United States v. Bryant.133  Bryant had at least five prior convictions of 
domestic assault in tribal court, and although he was indigent, he was never 
represented by appointed counsel.134  He did not receive more than one year 
imprisonment for any of his uncounseled tribal court convictions.135  
Therefore, his tribal convictions were in compliance with the ICRA but not 
the Sixth Amendment. 
In 2011, Bryant was indicted for two counts of domestic assault by a 
habitual offender.136  He moved to dismiss the indictment, but the district 
court denied the motion.137  He pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal 
the denial of his motion to dismiss.138  The court sentenced Bryant to 
forty-six months in prison for each count, with the sentences to run 
concurrently.139 
On appeal, Bryant argued that his federal conviction violated the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.140  The Ninth Circuit agreed that the convictions violated the Sixth 
Amendment, stating that “tribal court convictions may be used in 
subsequent prosecutions only if the tribal court guarantees a right to 
 
 128. Id. at 1001. 
 129. Id. (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 n.24 (1974)). 
 130. Id. at 1002. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1001–02. 
 133. United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 134. United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420, slip op. at 10 (U.S. June 13, 2016). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 672–73. 
 137. Id. at 673. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 673–74. 
 140. Id. at 674. 
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counsel that is, at minimum, coextensive with the Sixth Amendment 
right.”141 
The Ninth Circuit distinguished its holding from the Supreme Court’s 
precedent in Lewis v. United States and Nichols v. United States.142  In 
Lewis, the defendant, without counsel, was convicted and imprisoned for a 
felony in 1961.143  Lewis’s uncounseled conviction was valid because 
Gideon had not yet been decided.144  In 1977, Lewis was convicted of 
possession of a firearm by a felon with the 1961 uncounseled conviction 
permissibly serving as the underlying felony.145  In Bryant, the Ninth 
Circuit distinguished Lewis by deeming the prohibition on felons in 
possession of firearms more akin to “a criminal enforcement scheme for a 
civil disability,” while § 117 is “an ordinary recidivist statute.”146  The 
court called Lewis a “narrow exception” to the general rule that an 
uncounseled conviction may not be used in later proceedings.147 
In Nichols, the defendant “pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess 
cocaine with intent to distribute” in 1990.148  He received one criminal 
history point for a 1983 misdemeanor driving while intoxicated 
conviction.149  Nichols was not imprisoned for the 1983 conviction, so he 
was not appointed counsel.150  However, the extra point for that conviction 
increased the minimum sentence of his 1990 drug conviction by twenty 
months.151  The Supreme Court deemed it permissible to use the 1983 
uncounseled conviction to add a criminal history point, and thereby add 
more prison time, to the 1990 conviction because the punishment was 
solely for the 1990 conviction.152  The twenty months added to his 
minimum sentence was not punishment for the 1983 offense; it was merely  
part of the punishment for the 1990 conviction, which did not violate the 
Sixth Amendment.153  The Ninth Circuit distinguished Nichols by stating 
 
 141. Id. at 677. 
 142. Id. at 678. 
 143. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 56–57 (1980). 
 144. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 57 n.3. 
 145. Id. at 57–58. 
 146. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 677. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 740 (1994). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 740–41. 
 151. Id. at 740. 
 152. See id. at 749. 
 153. See id. 
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that his prior conviction was valid under the Sixth Amendment154 while 
Bryant’s predicate offenses were not.155  In Nichols, the Ninth Circuit 
recognized its conflict with Cavanaugh and Shavanaux but nonetheless 
held that it is “bound by Ant,” which held that an uncounseled tribal court 
plea could not be used in federal proceedings.156  Accordingly, the court 
concluded that Bryant’s charges ought to be dismissed.157 
B. Bryant at the Supreme Court 
To resolve this circuit split, the United States Supreme Court heard 
Bryant’s case and unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit.158  Justice 
Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the Court, and Justice Thomas wrote a 
concurring opinion.159 
1. Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions May Be Used as Predicate 
Offenses for § 117 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion began by summarizing statistics of 
domestic violence in Native American communities.160  She cited the high 
rates of domestic assault against Native Americans as compared to other 
racial groups, and she cited the high rates of recidivism among offenders.161  
Justice Ginsburg then discussed the limited authority of tribal courts to 
impose punishment.162  Although Congress amended the ICRA to allow 
tribal courts to sentence defendants to three years of incarceration instead 
of only one, Ginsburg noted, “few tribes have employed this enhanced 
sentencing authority,”163 and “[s]tates are unable or unwilling to fill the 
enforcement gap.”164  She opined that a sentence of only one year is 
“insufficient to deter repeated and escalating abuse.”165  In structuring her 
opinion this way, Justice Ginsburg described an insidious problem that the 
 
 154. Appointed counsel is only required when the conviction actually results in 
imprisonment.  Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979).  Nichols’s misdemeanor 
conviction did not result in imprisonment, so failing to appoint counsel was not a Sixth 
Amendment violation.  See Nichols, 445 U.S. at 740, 749. 
 155. United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 156. Id. at 678–79. 
 157. Id. at 679. 
 158. United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420 (U.S. June 13, 2016). 
 159. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 160. Id. at 2–4. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 4. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 5. 
 165. Id. at 6. 
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tribes and states are unable to remedy.  She framed § 117 as the federal 
government’s solution. 
Justice Ginsburg then focused on Bryant’s history of domestic assault.  
She wrote that his “conduct is illustrative of the domestic violence problem 
existing in Indian country”166 and that Bryant committed “repeated brutal 
acts of domestic violence.”167  Justice Ginsburg described the most 
shocking facts of Bryant’s prior convictions, such as the fact that he used a 
beer bottle to hit a woman in the head and tried to strangle her, and that he 
assaulted a different woman by kneeing her in the face and breaking her 
nose.168  She then described the 2011 assaults for which Bryant was 
convicted of two counts of domestic assault by a habitual offender.169  She 
wrote that in one attack, Bryant repeatedly punched and kicked a woman, 
and in the other incident, he choked a woman “until she almost lost 
consciousness.”170  Justice Ginsburg likely chose to include these horrific 
details to paint Bryant’s case as exemplary of the necessity of § 117. 
In analyzing the constitutionality of using uncounseled tribal 
convictions for § 117, Justice Ginsburg began by stating that Bryant’s prior 
convictions were valid in tribal court.171  She wrote, “Bryant urges us to 
treat tribal-court convictions, for § 117(a) purposes, as though they had 
been entered by a federal or state court,”172 meaning that the Sixth 
Amendment would apply and invalidate those convictions.  By framing 
Bryant’s argument in this way, Justice Ginsburg made it seem as if Bryant 
was asking the Court to adopt a fiction.  The convictions were not obtained 
in federal or state court, so by stating that Bryant was asking the Court to 
view them as if they were, Justice Ginsburg set up a good reason to 
disagree with Bryant. 
Justice Ginsburg then traced the reasoning of Nichols.173  Nichols 
deemed use of an uncounseled conviction as a sentencing enhancement 
constitutional  because the punishment was imposed only for the latter 
offense, not for the uncounseled conviction.174  Likewise, here, “Bryant’s 
46-month sentence for violating § 117(a) punishes his most recent acts of 
domestic assault, not his prior crimes prosecuted in tribal court.”175  Bryant 
 
 166. Id. at 10. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 10–11. 
 170. Id. at 11. 
 171. Id. at 2. 
 172. Id. at 13. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994). 
 175. Bryant, slip op. at 13. 
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was represented by counsel for his federal conviction, so there was no Sixth 
Amendment violation.176  Bryant’s convictions were valid in tribal court, so 
they should not somehow become invalid in federal court.177 
Justice Ginsburg then quickly dispensed with Bryant’s Due Process 
argument.178  Citing Shavanaux, she held that there was no Due Process 
violation because Bryant’s prior convictions comported with the ICRA.179  
Finding no Sixth Amendment or Due Process violation, the Court reversed 
the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.180  Therefore, based on Bryant, tribal 
convictions will continue to be used as predicate offenses under § 117. 
2. The Majority Opinion Glosses Over Tribal Sovereignty Concerns 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas wrote that he joined the 
Court’s opinion because it was soundly based on precedent.  However, he 
also wrote, “[t]he fact that this case arose at all, however, illustrates how 
far afield our Sixth Amendment and Indian-law precedents have gone.”181  
Justice Thomas then addressed three premises upon which the Court based 
its holding and wrote that while they are deeply rooted in precedent, there 
is no “sound constitutional basis for any of them.”182 
The Court’s first premise was that prior convictions obtained in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment generally cannot be used in subsequent 
proceedings.183  However, the Sixth Amendment only requires that the 
defendant be represented by counsel in the present proceeding.184  In 
Justice Thomas’s view, there should be no “Sixth Amendment 
‘exclusionary rule’ that prohibits the government from using” 
unconstitutional convictions as predicates for habitual offender laws.185 
The second premise was that the tribes can prosecute their own 
members in courts not governed by the Constitution, and the third 
assumption was that Congress may authorize United States courts to 
prosecute tribal members who commit crimes against other members on 
tribal land.186  Justice Thomas wrote that these two assumptions are 
 
 176. Id. at 13–14. 
 177. Id. at 14. 
 178. Id. at 15–16. 
 179. Id. at 16. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Bryant, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 13, 2016) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 182. Id. at 2–3. 
 183. Id. at 1. 
 184. Id. at 2. 
 185. Id. (quoting Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967)). 
 186. Id. at 2–3. 
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somewhat contradictory and “exemplify a central tension within our 
Indian-law jurisprudence.”187  Bryant’s tribal convictions were premised on 
the idea that the tribes are sovereign and may prosecute their own members 
without the restraints of the Constitution, but his federal conviction was 
premised on the federal government’s sovereignty to prosecute tribal 
members.188  As Justice Thomas observed, “even though tribal prosecutions 
of tribal members are purportedly the apex of tribal sovereignty, Congress 
can second-guess how tribes prosecute domestic abuse perpetrated by 
Indians against other Indians on Indian land by virtue of its ‘plenary power’ 
over Indian tribes.”189 
In Justice Thomas’s opinion, it is impossible to definitively say that 
either Congress or the tribes have sovereignty because a rule cannot be 
generalized and applied to each and every tribe.190  Because “Indian tribes 
have varied origins, discrete treaties with the United States, and different 
patterns of assimilation and conquest,” they have retained different levels 
of sovereignty.191  Justice Thomas posited a problem: United States 
precedence has long treated the individual tribes as possessing equal 
amounts of sovereignty, so it would be very difficult to now distinguish the 
tribes and calculate the degree of sovereignty that each possesses.192  It 
would be much easier to start with the sovereignty that the federal 
government has over the tribes.  However, Justice Thomas contends that 
nothing in the Constitution gives Congress plenary authority over Native 
Americans—neither the Indian Commerce Clause nor the power to approve 
treaties allows Congress to prosecute crimes like § 117.193  Although 
Justice Thomas posed this problem, he did not offer a solution.  He 
concluded by urging the Court to “reconsider these precedents,”194 but as 
he acknowledged, the precedents supporting the three premises are 
numerous and entrenched.195 
 
 187. Id. at 2. 
 188. Id. at 2–3. 
 189. Id. at 3. 
 190. See id. at 3. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See id. at 3–4. 
 194. Id. at 4. 
 195. See id. at 1–2. 
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C. Precedent and Policy Concerns Required that the Court Uphold 
Bryant’s § 117 Convictions 
Justice Ginsburg relied heavily on Nichols to support her conclusion 
that validly obtained convictions are admissible in subsequent federal court 
proceedings.196  Although Bryant seems distinguishable from Nichols at 
first blush,197 the Court relied on Nichols as a matter of precedent and as a 
matter of policy.  Nichols appears distinguishable because Nichols’s prior 
conviction, while uncounseled, comported with the Sixth Amendment.198  It 
was a misdemeanor for which he received no imprisonment, and it was 
used as a sentencing enhancement in a later offense.199  Since the Sixth 
Amendment has been interpreted to require appointed counsel only where 
actual imprisonment results,200 counsel was not required for Nichols’s 
misdemeanor, and there was no Sixth Amendment violation.201  Bryant’s 
convictions, on the other hand, were valid because of the inapplicability of 
the Sixth Amendment, not because of compliance with it. 
This distinction—inapplicability versus compliance—could be 
significant in a discussion of reliability.  Convictions that comport with the 
Sixth Amendment are deemed reliable, and convictions that do not, like 
Bryant’s tribal court convictions, may be unreliable in some cases.202  
However, Justice Ginsburg offers an explanation of why Bryant’s prior 
convictions are in fact as reliable as Nichols’s conviction.  Compliance 
with the Sixth Amendment hinges on whether an uncounseled conviction 
results in imprisonment, but the outcome of the proceedings alone should 
not determine the reliability of the proceeding itself.  For example, if 
Bryant’s trial had been exactly the same but he had been given a fine 
instead of an active sentence, his conviction would not automatically 
become more reliable.  All else being equal, the difference between a fine 
 
 196. Bryant, slip op. at 13–15. 
 197. See United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2014) (distinguishing its 
holding from that of Nichols). 
 198. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 740–41 (1994). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that “no person may be 
imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he 
was represented by counsel at his trial.”). 
 201. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 741–42. 
 202. See Samuel D. Newton, Reliability, That Should Be the Question: The 
Constitutionality of Using Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions in Subsequent Federal 
Trials After Ant, Cavanaugh, and Shavanaux, 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 489 (2012).  See also 
Nicholas LeTang, United States v. Bryant and the Subsequent Use of Uncounseled Tribal 
Court Convictions in State or Federal Prosecution, 77 MONT. L. REV. 211, 229 (2016) 
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and imprisonment should not translate into a reliable conviction in one 
instance but an unreliable conviction in the other. 
Additionally, because the federal government extends comity to tribal 
court convictions;203 deeming them unreliable could be an insult to the 
tribes and an intrusion on tribal sovereignty.  Both Bryant’s and Nichols’s 
prior convictions were reliable, so the distinction between inapplicability of 
the Sixth Amendment and compliance with it is immaterial in this case. 
Because Nichols was on point, the Court was correct in following its 
holding.  Convictions that are reliable and constitutional at their inception 
are also reliable and constitutional when used in subsequent proceedings.204  
This rationale also serves an important policy goal.  As Justice Ginsburg 
mentions, confusion would have resulted if the Court had created a 
“hybrid” set of offenses that are deemed reliable in one court system but 
not another.205  It is better policy to give full effect to tribal court 
convictions when they comply with the ICRA and to not doubt their 
reliability.  The ICRA is easier to understand and administer, maintains 
comity with the tribal courts, and does not reduce tribal sovereignty. 
The Court reached the correct result using the precedent that was 
available, but a problem remains.  It still seems unfair to allow uncounseled 
convictions to be used in federal offenses because defendants in tribal 
courts do not have the same level of constitutional protection as defendants 
in state courts.  Therefore, the proposals asserted in Part III do not argue 
against Justice Ginsburg’s reasoning, but attempt to add to it and find a just 
and fair way to reduce domestic violence in Native American communities. 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE FAIRNESS TO DEFENDANTS AFTER 
BRYANT 
With Bryant, the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split.  
Uncounseled tribal court convictions that would be unconstitutional if 
obtained in a United States court can be used as predicate offenses for 
§ 117.  Even though this legal issue is now resolved, it is not entirely 
satisfactory.  While Justice Ginsburg’s opinion is logically grounded in the 
precedent of Nichols, it does little to address the unfairness created by an 
under-resourced court system.  Tribal court systems are often unable and 
unrequired to provide attorneys for domestic violence defendants who may 
later be sentenced to up to ten years in federal prison based on these 
 
 203. Newton, supra note 202, at 501–02. 
 204. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748–49. 
 205. United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420, slip op. at 14 (U.S. June 13, 2016) (citing 
Nichols, 511 U.S. at 744). 
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uncounseled convictions.  Justice Ginsburg’s opinion recognizes the 
problem of domestic violence in Native American communities, but it does 
not address whether § 117 is the best option for combatting it. Three 
solutions address concerns of fairness to defendants, victims, and tribes.  
First, amend the ICRA to require appointed counsel for any domestic 
violence conviction.  Alternatively, repeal § 117, amend the ICRA to allow 
harsher penalties in tribal courts,  and require appointed counsel if harsher 
penalties are imposed.  In addition to either of these alternatives, federal 
tribal jurisdiction should be expanded to allow tribal courts to prosecute 
non-members who commit offenses within tribal territory. 
A. Amend the ICRA to Require Appointed Counsel For Any Conviction 
Applicable to § 117 
Congress and federal prosecutors agree that enacting and 
implementing a domestic assault by a habitual offender statute is the most 
effective way to combat domestic violence in Native American territory.206  
Section 117 seems to narrowly target the problem; domestic violence is 
widespread in part because the recidivism rate is high, so by imposing 
harsh penalties only for repeat offenders, the problem may be reduced 
without unnecessarily ruining the lives of defendants who are sufficiently 
deterred from reoffending by one conviction.  Section 117 may be the best 
way to reduce domestic assault.  However, it still seems unjust for an 
uncounseled tribal conviction to be used as a predicate offense. 
Congress already amended the ICRA to allow tribes to impose up to 
three years of imprisonment.207  It could again amend that statute to require 
appointed counsel in all domestic assault cases.208  The Ninth Circuit hinted 
at this idea in Bryant when it held that “tribal court convictions may be 
used in subsequent prosecutions only if the tribal court guarantees a right to 
counsel that is, at minimum, coextensive with the Sixth Amendment 
right.”209  If the ICRA is amended to require appointed counsel in all 
domestic assault proceedings, tribal court defendants would receive the 
same assistance of counsel as any other defendant in state or federal court.  
For that reason, this solution is fair to defendants.  It is also fair to victims 
 
 206. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109–162, sec. 901–902, 119 Stat. 2960, 3077–78 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 3796gg–10 (2012)); see generally Brief for Dennis Burke, supra note 89, at 10. 
 207. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2012). 
 208. Katherine Robillard, Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions: The Sixth Amendment, 
Tribal Sovereignty, and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 2047, 2081–84 
(2013). 
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because it allows the federal government to continue prosecuting repeat 
offenders. 
A counterargument to this solution is that it is not fair to the tribes. 
Amending the ICRA to require appointed counsel in all domestic assault 
proceedings would trample on tribal sovereignty.  If they are to be truly 
sovereign and not “domestic dependent nations,”210 they ought to be able to 
decide for themselves what rights to give to defendants.  Justice Thomas 
would likely take this stance; he wrote that the tribes historically gave up 
different amounts of sovereignty, and they should not be treated as an 
“undifferentiated mass.”211  He would likely agree that allowing the tribes 
to make their own rules, in accordance with the amount of sovereignty that 
each possesses, is the fair thing to do.   
Although this solution is still better than leaving the ICRA 
un-amended in the wake of Bryant, the next proposed solution does more to 
preserve tribal authority. 
B. Amend the ICRA to Give Tribal Courts Discretion Over Domestic 
Assault Penalties and Resources for Appointed Counsel 
Currently, tribal courts can only impose penalties of up to three years 
of imprisonment.212  If they impose more than one year of imprisonment, 
tribal courts must appoint counsel for indigent defendants.213  If the tribes 
could realistically impose penalties for domestic violence as harsh as the 
federal penalties—under § 117, up to five years of imprisonment if there is 
no resulting serious bodily injury and up to ten years if there is serious 
bodily injury214—federal intervention would not be needed.215 
In order for the tribes to realistically be able to impose harsher 
penalties, not only does the ICRA need to be amended to allow for harsher 
penalties, but it also needs to be amended to either (1) not require 
appointed counsel for sentences longer than one year or (2) appropriate 
federal funds to provide counsel for indigent defendants in tribal court.  
This is because, as Justice Ginsburg mentioned in her opinion, although 
 
 210. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
 211. United States v. Bryant, No. 15-420, slip op. at 4 (U.S. June 13, 2016) (Thomas, J., 
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 212. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b). 
 213. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c). 
 214. 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (Supp. II 2014). 
 215. See Rebecca A. Hart & M. Alexander Lowther, Honoring Sovereignty: Aiding 
Tribal Efforts to Protect Native American Women from Domestic Violence, 96 CALIF. L. 
REV. 185, 228 (briefly advocating for a waiver of the ICRA sentencing requirements for 
domestic assault cases). 
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they can sentence defendants to up to three years in prison, tribes do not 
often impose more than one year of imprisonment because any sentence 
longer than one year requires appointed counsel, and many tribes do not 
have sufficient resources to appoint counsel for every defendant.216  
The first way around that problem—removing the requirement to 
appoint counsel for long sentences—would be unfair to defendants.  They 
already have a different level of protection in tribal court, and sharpening 
the difference between tribal courts and United States courts would only 
exacerbate that imbalance.  Instead, the better solution is for the federal 
government to provide funds and resources to the tribes so that they may 
appoint counsel and fairly impose harsher sentences for domestic violence. 
This solution is fair to defendants because, like the first solution, it 
gives them the same level of right-to-counsel protection as defendants in 
state or federal courts.  It is fair to the tribes because it gives them a higher 
degree of sovereignty; allowing them to impose harsher penalties grants 
them authority that they do not have now.217 
One counterargument is that this solution is not fair to victims because 
there is no guarantee that tribal courts would actually impose harsh 
penalties for repeat offenders in the same way that § 117 does.  However, 
in its amicus brief, the National Congress of American Indians expressed 
confidence in tribal courts, drawing similarities to United States courts.218  
Tribal courts operate under a system of checks and balances,219 offer 
appellate review,220 provide protections for defendants,221 require training 
for judges,222 and the Northern Cheyenne Tribes “have adopted the 
American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct”223 and “adhere to 
robust and detailed codes of criminal procedure and evidence.”224  The 
National Congress posits that “tribes have no interest in error-prone 
 
 216. See Bryant, slip op. at 4. 
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courts.”225  Therefore, there is no reason to distrust that the tribes will 
prosecute repeat offenders with the same level of success as the federal 
government if they are given the chance. 
C. Expand Tribal Jurisdiction to Prosecute Non-Members Who Commit 
Offenses on Tribal Land 
Even implementing one of the above solutions, larger jurisdictional 
questions remain unresolved.  Tribal courts are limited in jurisdiction.226  
Jurisdiction depends on the identity of the defendant, the identity of the 
victim, and the nature of the crime.227  Tribes cannot prosecute 
non-members, even when they commit acts of violence against victims who 
are members and who live within tribal territory.228 
As Justice Thomas described, the tribes are not one entity; they are 
diverse, and they have diverse needs and capabilities.229  The Eastern Band 
of Cherokee Indians (hereinafter referred to as the EBCI), located in 
western North Carolina, provides an example of a tribe willing and able to 
effectively prosecute domestic violence offenses. 
The EBCI is a relatively small tribe with approximately 12,000 
enrolled members.230  It also occupies a relatively small geographic area.231  
It receives stable income from a casino.232  Because of its financial 
resources and small territory, the EBCI has not experienced the problem of 
being too under-resourced to provide counsel to defendants.233  In fact, the 
EBCI requires appointed counsel for any charge that could result in 
imprisonment.234  Every conviction therefore comports with the Sixth 
Amendment. 
An EBCI ordinance criminalizes domestic violence.235  The ordinance 
states that “the official response to cases of domestic violence is that 
violent crime will not be excused or tolerated.”236  Eighty-eight criminal 
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domestic violence charges were filed in fiscal year 2015.237  Of those, 14% 
pled guilty, 40% were dismissed (80% of dismissals were pursuant to a 
plea), and 35% are still pending.238  For such a small population, this 
number of charges filed is significant. 
The EBCI has a robust and capable system for addressing domestic 
violence.  However, it is not immune to the problems associated with 
repeat offenders, the defendants that § 117 is designed to target.239  These 
repeat offenders are not sufficiently deterred by the limited punishments 
the tribal court can give.  When asked if § 117 is a useful and needed law, 
Tribal Prosecutor Justin Eason responded that it absolutely is.240  He 
described the “overlapping patchwork system” of jurisdiction and said that 
federal courts are not well-equipped to handle day-to-day, petty crime, such 
as simple assaults.241  “While the Violence Against Women Act242 of 2013 
is a step in the right direction,” Mr. Eason said, “it goes to highlight the 
gaps in criminal jurisdiction over offenders who violate laws on the 
reservation, and these gaps need to be addressed . . . [t]he best forum for 
them is the community in which the crimes occurred.”243  Mr. Eason 
supports expanded jurisdiction for tribal courts, particularly in cases of 
domestic violence where non-members assault EBCI members.244 
Like the proposal to amend the ICRA to allow for harsher 
punishments by tribal courts, Mr. Eason’s solution would be immensely 
fair to the tribes, because it gives them a greater degree of sovereignty.  It 
would also be fair to victims, who would be assured that their own 
community possesses the jurisdiction to successfully prosecute cases of 
domestic violence.  Finally, at least in the case of the EBCI, it would be fair 
to defendants, who have a right to counsel coextensive with the Sixth 
Amendment right. 
This solution, however, may not be as feasible in larger tribes that do 
not possess the resources necessary to appoint counsel for all defendants 
facing imprisonment.  Many tribes likely choose not to impose more than a 
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year of imprisonment because they cannot provide appointed counsel.245  If 
all tribes had the resources of the EBCI, or if the federal government were 
to assist the tribes in appointing counsel, expanding the jurisdiction of 
tribes would be a viable solution because it would enable more 
prosecutions in the local courts and communities that are best able to 
combat domestic violence. 
CONCLUSION 
Bryant resolved a circuit split regarding the use of uncounseled tribal 
court convictions when prosecuting defendants under federal habitual 
offender laws.  Because the tribal convictions are valid at their inception, 
they may be used in subsequent federal court proceedings, regardless of 
whether they are in compliance with the Sixth Amendment.  The logic is 
sound, but the result is unfair to defendants. 
One solution is for the United States to continue prosecuting habitual 
offenders under § 117 but to amend the ICRA to require appointed counsel 
for all domestic assault cases in tribal court.  That way, defendants are 
treated fairly because they receive the same level of protection in tribal 
court as defendants in state or federal court. 
Another, and perhaps better, solution is to amend the ICRA to allow 
tribes to impose harsher punishments for domestic violence and to provide 
federal funds for appointing counsel for indigent defendants.  This solution 
is fair to defendants, who receive appointed counsel, and to the tribes, who 
are given more sovereignty.  Both solutions are fair to victims, for repeat 
offenders would be still prosecuted. 
A third solution, which may be implemented in addition to the other 
two, is to expand the jurisdiction of tribal courts to enable them to 
prosecute domestic assaults by non-members.  Justice Ginsburg’s opinion 
in Bryant is soundly grounded in precedent, but amending the ICRA 
according to any of the three solutions would be even better for defendants, 
victims, and tribes. 
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